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Pharmaceutical Care Management Association v. Rutledge 
Abstract 
On June 8, 2018 the federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals announced its decision concerning Arkansas' 
attempt to regulate perceived unfair payment practices of pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) in the case 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association v. Rutledge.1 Because pharmacies across the country 
face similar problems, and this ruling may influence other federal appellate courts, review and discussion 
is useful for the purpose of making strategic decisions. 
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Pharmaceutical Care Management Association v. Rutledge 
John Crean, PharmD Candidate, Wegmans School of Pharmacy, St John Fisher College 
Karl G. Williams, RPh, LLM, JD, Professor Pharmacy Ethics and l aw, Wegmans School of Pharmacy, 
St John Fisher College 
On June 8, 2018 the federal Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals announced its decision concerning 
Arkansas' attempt to regulate perceived unfair 
payment practices of pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs) in the case Pharmaceutical Care Management 
Association v. Rutledge.1 Because pharmacies across 
the country face similar problems, and this ruling 
may influence other federal appellate courts, review 
and discussion is useful for the purpose of making 
strategic decisions. 
Background: Pharmacy benefi t managers, among 
other services provided to plan "sponsors" (health 
insurance plans, unions, state Medicaid providers, 
and Medicare Part D), compensate pharmacies for 
generic medication based on a "maximum allowable 
cost" for each medication. Maximum allowable cost 
("MAC") lists offered to pharmacies without negotia-
tion, and remain in effect for the contract period. 
Different manufacturers wil l charge different prices 
for interchangeable generic drugs; in theory, MAC 
pricing creates an incentive for pharmacies to 
purchase the least costly generic medication 
available in the market. However, because the MAC 
price is fixed, and not subject to changes in cost, 
pharmacies might often be required to dispense 
medication at a price that is lower than their actual 
cost. The Arkansas state legislature attempted to 
address disastrous effects this was having on 
independent pharmacies. Act 9002 provided 
compensation for generic drugs at a price equal to 
or higher that the pharmacies' cost based on the 
invoice from the wholesaler. The act also requires 
PBMs to update their Maximum Allowable Cost 
(MAC) list within seven days from the time of a 
certain increase in acquisition cost. Act 900 further 
allows pharmacies the ability to "decline to 
dispense" when the pharmacy would otherwise be 
dispensing at less the cost. 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association 
(PCMA) sued the state alleging that Arkansas key 
provisions were "preempted" by both Employee Re-
t irement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the 
Medicare Modernization Act's Medicare Part D. The 
federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas ruled the state statute preempted by ERISA, 
but not preempted by Medicare Part D.3 PCMA 
appealed the Medicare Part D ruling, and the state 
cross-appealed the ERISA ruling to the federal Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
"Preemption doctrine" is the pivotal legal 
principle in this case. Rooted in the Supremacy 
Clause4 of the US Constitution, the legal doctrine 
provides that when the federal law 'intends' to 
preempt state law, federal law controls. Congress' 
intent may be implied or expressed. Preemption may 
be inferred when the federal law is so comprehensive 
that any state attempt to regulate would be in 
conflict or defeat the intended regulation. Congress 
may also expressly preempt state laws, by specif ically 
stat ing in statute specific state actions that are off 
limits. ERISA and Medicare Part D both expressly 
preempt conflict ing state act ions. In this case the 
courts were asked to decide whether the elements of 
Act 900 were distinguishable from ERISA and 
Medicare Part D. 
ERISA: Enacted in 1974, the purpose of ERISA 
was setting minimum standards for employer-
sponsored health and pension plans. ERISA case law 
long ago established that a "state law is preempted if 
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it 'relates to'" or has "a connection with reference to 
such a plan";5 a very broad standard. In this case, the 
District court re lied on legal precedent from an Iowa 
case (in the same federal circuit as Arkansas).6 The 
court ruled the Iowa law preempted because it had a 
prohibited "reference to" ERISA and it interfered with 
"national uniform plan administration". Specifically, 
the Iowa statute required PBMs to provide 
information about their pricing methodologies and 
limited the types of drugs PBMs could apply MAC 
pricing to. By regulating the conduct of PBMs 
administering or managing pharmacy benefits, the 
court held that the Iowa statute "both explicitly and 
implicitly referred to ERISA". The District court 
determined the Iowa precedent to control the out-
come in Arkansas because PBMs "administer benefits 
for 'covered entities' ... which include health benefit 
plans", the object of ERISA. That is, ERISA provides 
shelter for a PBM, not because they are a health plan, 
but due to their contractual relationship with a health 
plan. With little additional analysis, the Eighth Circuit 
appellate court agreed, upholding the lower court's 
decision. 
Medicare Part D: The Medicare Modernizat ion 
Act (Medicare Part D) prohibits interference with any 
government entity in negotiations between PBMs 
and pharmacies. Popularly known as the "non-
interference clause'} explicit preemption exists for 
state laws that act "with respect to" standards 
established by Congress or CMS. The Medicare Part 
D statute requires the creation of a network of 
pharmacies "to ensure convenient access"8 by 
patients. Also, CMS regulat ions provide a definition 
for "negotiated prices" (the MAC list). 
PCMA argued that Act 900's regulation of prices 
interfered with both the negot iated prices standard 
and the convenient access to pharmacy provisions, 
and were preempted interference by the state. The 
district court disagreed with this interpretation, 
reasoning that the negotiated MAC prices were 
insubstantial and that the alternative pricing structure 
was to provide transparency and to control the PBM 
practices. Also, declining to dispense on a single 
occasion, the District court reasoned, does not take 
the pharmacy out of the network and deprive the 
patient of convenient access. As a result, the lower 
court ru led that Act 900 did not interfere and not 
preempted by Medicare Part D. 
The Eighth Circuit overruled the decision of the 
District court, criticizing the lower court for its 
'cursory' reasoning. The appellate court reasoned 
that Act 900 essentially replaces the negotiated MAC 
price with the pharmacy acquisition cost when the 
MAC rate is below the pharmacy's invoice cost. thus 
acting "with respect to" 'negotiated' MAC prices 
Medicare Part D has a Pharmacy Access 
Standard that gives recipients access to pharmacies. 
A PBM "shall secure the participation in its network of 
a sufficient number of pharmacies that dispense 
drugs directly to patients to ensure convenient 
access." The district court decided that Act 900 did 
not act with respect to that pharmacy access stand-
ard because the decline-to-dispense provisions do 
not render a pharmacy as out of network. The Eighth 
Circuit court of Appeals disagreed. The Eighth Circuit 
decided that a pharmacy that refused to dispense 
becomes "in effect" an out-of-network pharmacy for 
that transaction. This is enough, reasoned the 
appellate court, to preempt the Arkansas state law. 
Comments: The Eighth Circuit's rulings have 
effectively gutted the Arkansas law with extremely 
superficial reasoning regarding both ERISA and 
Medicare Part D. A contractual relationship with a 
health care plan sponsor does not make a PBM a 
health plan. They are merely a conduit that is not 
worthy of derivative shelter under the ERISA law. 
Also, Arkansas was correct that "negotiation" of MAC 
(continued on page 31) 
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prices had no substantial meaning; every pharmacy 
owner appreciates that there is no negotiation with 
PBMs over MAC prices. In this context. 'take-it or 
leave-it' offers do not constitute 'negotiation' under 
any common understanding of the word. 
The Eighth Circuit has made its decisions relative 
to this business practice. Given the well-appreciated 
imbalance of bargaining power between PBMs and 
pharmacies, and the effects on pharmacies (small 
businesses fa iling), consumer prices (increasing), and 
costs to plan sponsors (skyrocketing) it will be inter-
esting to see how states respond. If indeed the 
Eighth Circuit's analysis proves influential, additional 
state actions wil l be futile. It would be up to Congress 
to adjust the preemption provisions in ERISA and 
Medicare Part D. 
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